Because Dworkin stamped on my ideas in class today, I feel the need to explain my Humean view of motivation in some amount of detail.
I am not a motivational internalist. What this means is that I do not believe normative judgments are motivating. The judgment "I should do x" does not motivate me to actually do x. It's just a judgment; it exists in a vacuum. "Reasons" for action (as in "I should do x") are parasitic on desires.
Here's how it works: I have a Subjective Motivational Set (SMS) which consists of all the desires I have, {D1, D2,..., Dn}. These desires can be specific ("I want chocolate cake") or general ("I want to be a good person") or anything in between.
These desires form goals or ends for me. The goal of the above two desires are actually eating chocolate cake or being a good person. What reason does is tell us how to get there. I have a reason to go to a bakery only insofar as it gets me chocolate cake. I have a reason to give to charity only insofar as I desire to be a good person. The reasons are parasitic on the desires.
So, reasons provide the means for our particular ends. Desire D1 leads to means M1. D2 leads to M2, etc. Thus, I have a set of reasons for action, {M1, M2,..., Mn}. Oftentimes, however, the elements in this set recommend inconsistent actions. If I have only $1, and I pass a homeless person on the street on my way to the bakery, I have to decide which desire wins out: cake or being good. I make the choice based on which option I prefer. Here, there are two possible outcomes: (1) I choose one thing, spend the money on that, and go home feeling satisfied, and (2) I choose one thing, spend the money on that, and go home feeling bad about myself because I feel like I made the wrong choice.
I am not concerned with #2. If you buy the cake and then feel bad about it, that means your desire to be a good person was more important to you, and you simply failed to recognize that. Akrasia, or weakness of the will, results because we're evolutionarily wired to disproportionately weight immediate benefits.
Possibility #1 is more interesting. I buy the cake, am happy with my choice, and then later decide, "You know, I would rather be the type of person who cares more about helping the homeless." The brilliant part about the human brain is that our SMS is not set in stone. My reason gives me the ability to figure out the best way to modify my SMS by pushing down some desires and elevating others. We can train ourselves to be passionate about particular issues.
The final point on this issue is whether the parasitism of reason on desire provides what we want out of morality. If I have a reason to be a good person only insofar as I desire to be a good person, what do we say about the person who does not desire to be a good person? I do not believe the amoral person has a "reason" to be good. Reasons are internal; they do not exist independent of the reason-holder. If somebody does not want to be a good person, they have no reason to do so.
This strikes some people as implausible. Indeed, we read an entire paper this year trying to justify why a cruel man nonetheless "has a reason" to be nice. I don't think he does. However, I still think we can criticize him. If somebody has an antisocial SMS, I feel entirely justified in shunning him or making efforts to get him out of society, but I don't think that that has anything to do with "reasons."
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
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Interesting... but...
ReplyDelete1) The amoral person has reason to be good. Perhaps not because she desires to be good, but perhaps because she desires cake, and knows that the reward for being good is access to more cake (which, actually, is true for anyone who has been invited to a birthday party).
2) As always, there is a possibility 3. That no matter what I chose, I would be dissatisfied. The grass is always greener in that case.
So, in that sense, reason can provide what we want out of morality, as long as there are sufficient rewards to cover the desires of most people such that most people can fairly easily understand that they are required to act morally in order to get more cake (or whatever it is that they desire).
I suspect that possibility #3 speaks to whether or not people will change their behavior very much, though. So, perhaps reason is insufficient if the actor knows that either way, she will be dissatisfied.